The Talk:’Black Codes’ –No Probable Cause Freddie Gray’s flight and FALSE IMPRISONMENT; Mississippi whites began passing laws to take away the former slaves’ new found freedom.’Stop and Frisk’

“The Talk” Probable Cause Unlawful Detainment/arrest

            The disparate treatment in the American criminal justice system begins at the very first stage of that system:

Equal Protection Clause

giving rise to the necessity of :

THE TALK

“In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.”
— George Orwell

Statutory limitations on individual freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution are examined for substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Vague Terms like acting Irate, resisting, gang are undefinable as a human action. successful as

PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES: For the takeaway is so often base,

a reflection more of people’s fears and insecurities than of our hopes and dreams.

our constitutional right to freedom of movement.[Note 1][Note 2]]

Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). I am not persuaded that the mere fact that someone standing on a sidewalk looked in the direction of a passing car before starting to run is sufficient to justify a forcible stop and frisk.

            The disparate treatment in the American criminal justice system begins at the very first stage of that system: Equal Protection Clause
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are two of the most important concepts in deciding the when it is appropriate for police to make an arrest, search for evidence and stop a person for questioning.
The investigation of suspected criminal activity by law enforcement agents.
Police departments disproportionately politically economically target, skewing at the outset the racial composition of the population ultimately charged, convicted and incarcerated. And too often the police employ tactics against minorities that simply shock the conscience.

The Court hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement.[Note 1][Note 2]]

The Equal Protection Clause requires each state to provide equal protection under the law to ‘ALL PEOPLE’ within its jurisdiction.

Black Codes like Stop and Frisk Laws, iaw SCOTUS,Court Most Supreme:

gives excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause to arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone.[3]

The Fourth Amendment REQUIRES that COPS have a reasonable suspicion

that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed BEFORE stopping a suspect.

The Equal Protection Clause requires each state to provide equal protection under the law to ‘ALL PEOPLE’ within its jurisdiction.

The Constitution does not offer a definition probable cause.-Making Probable Cause a “Black Code” Reason

“weighs testimony, whilst the latter, conscious perhaps of its inability to do so or careless of the consequences of error, at times rejects whole portions en masse , and at others converts pieces of evidence into rules of law by investing with conclusive effect some whose probative force has been found to be in general considerable. . . .” SCOTUS

The Court hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement.[Note 1][Note 2]]

Black Codes

African Americans arrested and convicted under the Black Codes could be, and usually were, forced to work on plantations. Since most African-Americans had until recently been unpaid slaves, few possessed money to pay the fines assessed for their “crimes.”

louisiana-prisoners-walking-from-farm-work-detail-600x449

Bobby JinDal The Fourth Amendment requires that the police have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed before stopping a suspect.

In the United States, the “ORPHAN/Black Codes”

Children are tortured in police custody. They are held in prisons in inhuman and degrading conditions. They are denied the due process which should guarantee them fair trials. They are held for years without charge. They are forgotten by the world that walks past the bars of their existence.

These laws passed by Southern states in 1865 and 1866, after the Civil War. These laws had the intent and the effect of restricting African Americans’ freedom, and of compelling them to work in a labor economy based on low wages or debt.

Ronald Brockmeyer, the municipal judge in Ferguson, has resigned less than a week after a scathing federal report called his court little more than an ATM for the city. And the Missouri Supreme Court has ordered all Ferguson municipal court cases transferred to Judge Roy L. Richter of the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Ferguson collected $2.6 million in court fines and fees.  Ferguson officials “have built a municipal scheme designed to brutalize, to punish, and to profit.”

Plus 2. Blue  fed Tax dollars also pay the tab for the same in-mate care.

Fed Blue Tax Dollars paid to governors Red and Blue

Fed Blue Tax Dollars paid to governors Red and Blue

GEO Group, Inc.

GEO Group is one of the largest security firms in the world and the nation’s second largest for-profit prison operator. GEO operates 50 facilities in 16 states and one in Guantanamo Bay.

In 2008, GEO Group earned $1.14 billion in U.S. revenue with a net income of $59.8 million.

CCA has been able to charge up to $200/day per bed in the Don T. Hutto family Immigration detention facility in Texas.

Plus 3. Private prisons profit on the Free-prison Labor .

Plus 4. Forfeitures are available to arresting officers.

Being paid for the same fees by all cycles of the prison industry lends to motive, lack of probable cause and enforcement of Black Codes.

Last year, NPR’s investigative series Guilty and Charged revealed that all 50 states add long lists of fines and fees for court services, including the cost of a public defender, and room and board for jail stays. The investigation also found that when the poor struggle to pay those fees — often with penalties that push costs to hundreds or thousands of dollars — they are sent to jail for not paying the fines, even though debtors prisons were outlawed before the Civil War.

Definitions Of Probable Cause Vs. Reasonable Suspicion

Freddie Gray’s arrest;He’s gone,” Richard Shipley, Gray’s stepfather,knife on ground freddy gray Lt Brian RiceFreddy gray knife

Written by J. Hirby | Fact checked by The Law Dictionary staff |
Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are two of the most important concepts in deciding the when it is appropriate for police to make an arrest, search for evidence and stop a person for questioning. Probable cause and reasonable suspicion have evolved through state and federal court decisions, but they began in the U.S. Supreme Court.

“A person, however conscious of innocence, might not have courage to stand a trial, but might, although innocent, think it necessary to consult his safety by flight. It may be,”

added the learned judge,

“a conscious anticipation of punishment for guilt, as the guilty will always anticipate the

Page 160 U. S. 419

consequences; but at the same time it may possibly be, according to the frame of mind, merely an inclination to consult his safety by flight, rather than stand his trial on a charge so heinous and scandalous as this.”

He’s gone,” Richard Shipley, Gray’s stepfather, Black Painroasting Samali child

The Due Process Clause prohibits state and local government officials from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without legislative authorization.

The Equal Protection Clause requires each state to provide equal protection under the law to all people within its jurisdiction.

 

Probable Cause to Arrest

The Fourth Amendment

to the United States Constitution states that people have the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. It goes on to specify that a search warrant cannot be issued unless there is probable cause for doing so.

The Constitution does not offer a definition probable cause.-Making probable Cause a “Black Code”

Providing a definition was left to the justices of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment use of the word “seizure” to mean both the seizure of evidence and, as in an arrest, the seizure of a person. The Court also applied probable cause to searches, seizures and arrests conducted without a warrant.

According to the Supreme Court, probable cause to make an arrest exists when an officer has knowledge of such facts as would lead a reasonable person to believe that a particularindividual is committing, has committed or is about to commit a criminal act. The officer must be able to articulate the facts and circumstances forming the basis for probable cause.

-1 2837E10200000578-3064698-image-a-34_1430515635106

 

Black Codes

Also found in: Encyclopedia, Wikipedia.

Black Codes and Stop and Frisk:  A body of laws, statutes, and rules enacted by southern states immediately after the Civil War to regain control over the freed slaves, maintain white supremacy, and ensure the continued supply of cheap labor.

The Union’s victory over the South in the Civil War signaled the end for the institution of Slavery in the United States. Ratified in 1865, theThirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution formalized this result in U.S. law, abolishing slavery throughout the country and every territory subject to its jurisdiction.

Scheme: For the next several months, southern states sought a way to restore for the white majority what the Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment had tried to deny them, supremacy, control, and economic power over the fate of African Americans.

Under slavery, whites had disciplined the blacks largely outside the law, through extralegal whippings administered by slavers and their overseers.

Gordon,_scourged_back,_colored_slide_2

Process: After the slaves were emancipated, panicky whites feared that blacks would seek revenge against them for their harsh and inhumane treatment on the southern plantations. Former slave owners feared for themselves, their families, and their property.

While some white southerners thought that African-Americans were best controlled through Vigilantism, Mississippi whites began passing laws to take away the former slaves’ new found freedom.

Juvenile Justice

  • The first such law was enacted on November 22, 1865. It directed civil officers to hire orphaned African Americans and forbade the orphans to leave their place of employment for any reason.

    (formerly the Biloxi City Jail) currently run by Director Warden. A fire in 1982 killed 27 inmates. There is currently a lawsuit against them, which has forced them to reduce their inmate population. They must now maintain an 8:1 inmate to staff ratio.

    Orphan “Black Code” Harrison County Juvenile Detention Center in Biloxi, Mississippi is operated by Mississippi Security Services

Orphans were typically compensated with a free place to live, free meals, and some type of nominal wage. Other white employers were prohibited from offering any enticement to blacks “employed” by someone else.

Probable Cause Case law

[See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.352 (1983), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the constitutionality of laws that allow police to demand that “loiterers” and “wanderers” provide identification.

Using the construction of the California appellate court in Solomon, the Court held that the law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause to arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone.[3] The Court hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement.[Note 1][Note 2]]

Stop and Frisk

The Mississippi legislature next passed a Vagrancylaw, defining vagrants as workers who “neglected their calling or employment or misspent what they earned.”

Another Mississippi law required African Americans to:

  • carry with them written evidence of their present employment at all times, a practice that was hauntingly reminiscent of the old pass system under slavery.

The final piece to the puzzle came when Mississippi established a system of special county courts to punish blacks charged with violating one of the new state employment laws. The law imposed draconian punishments, including “corporal chastisement” for blacks who refused to work or otherwise tried to [frustrate] the system.African Americans who committed real crimes, such as stealing, could be hung by their thumbs.

Probable Cause Case Law

[The shooting unfolded Saturday night after Officer Benjamin Deen, 34, stopped a vehicle for a speeding violation, then called for backup after he found probable cause to search the car,

Prison Industry  Widely considered to be the first set of Black Codes passed in the south after the Civil War, these Mississippi laws represented a concerted effort by white lawmakers to restore the master-slave relationship under a new name. Within a few months after Mississippi passed its first such law,Alabama,Georgia, Louisiana,Florida, Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina followed suit by enacting similar laws of their own.

Congress quickly responded to the Black Codes by passing the civil rights act of 1866,which made it illegal to discriminate against blacks by assigning them an inferior legal and economic status. Two years later the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, which guaranteed “equal protection of the laws” to the residents of every state.

But the southern states were not deterred. They soon passed a new set of laws that permitted local officials to informally discriminate against blacks, without specific statutory authority. The thrust-and-parry exchanges between Congress and the southern states continued throughout the period Reconstruction (1865-77) and through the first half of the twentieth century.

Black Codes = Stop and Frisk: Freddy Gray, Eric Garner, Walter Scott

John D Ferguson Missouri Prison Industry/Slaver

Stop and frisk

A brief, non-intrusive, police stop of a suspect.  The Fourth Amendment requires that the police have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed before stopping a suspect.  If the police reasonably suspect the person is armed and dangerous, they may conduct a frisk, a quick pat-down of the person’s outer clothing.   See Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, (1967).

Terry v. Ohio Even assuming we know that a person runs because he sees the police, the inference to be drawn may still vary from case to case. Flight to escape police detection, we have said, may have an entirely innocent motivation: “[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.

Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that `the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.

Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury–not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves.” Alberty v. United States, 162 U. S. 499, 511 (1896).

The probative force of the inferences

to be drawn from flight

Running while black as probable cause?

Running While Black

Hickory v. United States , 160 U. S. 408, 419-420 896) 

is a function of the varied circumstances in which it occurs. Sometimes those inferences are entirely consistent with the presumption of innocence, sometimes they justify further investigation, and sometimes they justify an immediate stop and search for weapons.

charging documents freddie gray redacted_PofP8

Freddie Gray Police Report and why cops lie: Lack of Probable Cause as described by Law

These considerations have led us to avoid categorical rules concerning a person’s flight and the presumptions to be drawn therefrom:

“Few things distinguish an enlightened system of judicature from a rude and barbarous one more than the manner in which they deal with evidence. The former weighs testimony, whilst the latter, conscious perhaps of its inability to do so or careless of the consequences of error, at times rejects whole portions en masse , and at others converts pieces of evidence into rules of law by investing with conclusive effect some whose probative force has been found to be in general considerable. . . .

Our ancestors, observing that guilty persons usually fled from justice, adopted the hasty conclusion that it was only the guilty who did so . . . so that under the old law, a man who fled to avoid being tried for felony forfeited all his goods even though he were acquitted … .

In modern times more correct views have prevailed, and the evasion of or flight from justice seems now nearly reduced to its true place in the administration of the criminal law, namely, that of a circumstance

a fact which it is always of importance to take into consideration, and combined with others may afford strong evidence of guilt, but which, like any other piece of presumptive evidence,

it is equally absurd and dangerous to invest with infallibility.” Hickory v. United States , 160 U. S. 408, 419-420 (1896) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Unprovoked flight,

in short, describes a category of activity too broad and varied to permit a per se reasonable inference regarding the motivation for the activity. While the innocent explanations surely do not establish that the Fourth Amendment is always violated whenever someone is stopped solely on the basis of an unprovoked flight,

neither do the suspicious motivations establish that the Fourth Amendment is never violated when a Terry stop is predicated on that fact alone. For these reasons, the Court is surely correct in refusing to embrace either per se rule advocated by the parties. The totality of the circumstances, as always, must dictate the result. 13  

II

     Guided by that totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court concludes that Officer Nolan had reasonable suspicion to stop respondent. Ante , at 5. In this respect, my view differs from the Court’s. The entire justification for the stop is articulated in the brief testimony of Officer Nolan. Some facts are perfectly clear; others are not. This factual insufficiency leads me to conclude that the Court’s judgment is mistaken.

Respondent Wardlow was arrested a few minutes after noon on September 9, 1995. 183 Ill. 2d 306, 308, n. 1, 701 N. E. 2d 484, 485, n. 1 (1998). 14   Nolan was part of an eight-officer, four-car caravan patrol team. The officers were headed for “one of the areas in the 11th District [of Chicago] that’s high [in] narcotics traffic.” App. 8. 15   The reason why four cars were in the caravan was that “[n]ormally in these different areas there’s an enormous amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers.” Ibid. Officer Nolan testified that he was in uniform on that day, but he did not recall whether he was driving a marked or an unmarked car. Id., at 4.

Officer Nolan and his partner were in the last of the four patrol cars that “were all caravaning eastbound down Van Buren.” Id., at 8. Nolan first observed respondent “in front of 4035 West Van Buren.” Id., at 7. Wardlow “looked in our direction and began fleeing.” Id., at 9. Nolan then “began driving southbound down the street observing [respondent] running through the gangway and the alley southbound,” and observed that Wardlow was carrying a white, opaque bag under his arm. Id., at 6, 9. After the car turned south and intercepted respondent as he “ran right towards us,” Officer Nolan stopped him and conducted a “protective search,” which revealed that the bag under respondent’s arm contained a loaded handgun. Id., at 9-11.

This terse testimony is most noticeable for what it fails to reveal. Though asked whether he was in a marked or unmarked car, Officer Nolan could not recall the answer. Id., at 4. He was not asked whether any of the other three cars in the caravan were marked, or whether any of the other seven officers were in uniform. Though he explained that the size of the caravan was because “[n]ormally in these different areas there’s an enormous amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers,” Officer Nolan did not testify as to whether anyone besides Wardlow was nearby 4035 West Van Buren. Nor is it clear that that address was the intended destination of the caravan. As the Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted the record, “it appears that the officers were simply driving by, on their way to some unidentified location, when they noticed defendant standing at 4035 West Van Buren.” 287 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370-371, 678 N. E. 2d 65, 67 (1997). 16   Officer Nolan’s testimony also does not reveal how fast the officers were driving. It does not indicate whether he saw respondent notice the other patrol cars. And it does not say whether the caravan, or any part of it, had already passed Wardlow by before he began to run.

Indeed, the Appellate Court thought the record was even “too vague to support the inference that … defendant’s flight was related to his expectation of police focus on him.” Id., at 371, 678 N. E. 2d, at 67. Presumably, respondent did not react to the first three cars, and we cannot even be sure that he recognized the occupants of the fourth as police officers. The adverse inference is based entirely on the officer’s statement: “He looked in our direction and began fleeing.” App. 9. 17  

No other factors sufficiently support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Though respondent was carrying a white, opaque bag under his arm, there is nothing at all suspicious about that. Certainly the time of day–shortly after noon–does not support Illinois’ argument. Nor were the officers “responding to any call or report of suspicious activity in the area.” 183 Ill. 2d, at 315, 701 N. E. 2d, at 488. Officer Nolan did testify that he expected to find “an enormous amount of people,” including drug customers or lookouts, App. 8, and the Court points out that “[i]t was in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him flee.” Ante, at 4. This observation, in my view, lends insufficient weight to the reasonable suspicion analysis; indeed, in light of the absence of testimony that anyone else was nearby when respondent began to run, this observation points in the opposite direction.

The State, along with the majority of the Court, relies as well on the assumption that this flight occurred in a high crime area. Even if that assumption is accurate, it is insufficient because even in a high crime neighborhood unprovoked flight does not invariably lead to reasonable suspicion. On the contrary, because many factors providing innocent motivations for unprovoked flight are concentrated in high crime areas, the character of the neighborhood arguably makes an inference of guilt less appropriate, rather than more so. Like unprovoked flight itself, presence in a high crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979); see also n. 15, supra .

It is the State’s burden to articulate facts sufficient to support reasonable suspicion. Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). In my judgment, Illinois has failed to discharge that burden. I am not persuaded that the mere fact that someone standing on a sidewalk looked in the direction of a passing car before starting to run is sufficient to justify a forcible stop and frisk.

I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment to reverse the court below.

 

Black Codes

Throughout the Democratic-dominated South, state governments enacted laws designed specifically to put African-Americans back to work.

Though the South had lost the war, President Andrew Johnson, who took office after the assassination of Lincoln in April 1865, allowed former Confederate leaders back into the government with relative ease.

These “Black Codes” applied to African-Americans living in southern states.
African-Americans wandering without proof of employment faced charges of vagrancy, for example.
African Americans arrested and convicted under the Black Codes could be, and usually were, forced to work on plantations. Since most African-Americans had until recently been unpaid slaves, few possessed money to pay the fines assessed for their “crimes.”

Fourteenth Amendment

In direct response to the Black Codes, the Republican-controlled Congress passed the 14th Amendment on July 28, 1868, to guarantee citizenship and civil rights to African-Americans.

For the first time in the nation’s history, the government felt a need to define citizenship. All persons born or naturalized within the borders of the United States were automatically citizens both of the nation and the state in which they resided. African-Americans, who’d had a presence in America since 1619, generally fell into this category.

Furthermore, the amendment prevented state governments from creating laws that apply only to specific groups. This provision theoretically made the Black Codes unconstitutional.

Describing the tool that supposedly justified Gray’s arrest as “a short-bladed folding knife similar to ones worn everyday by millions of law-abiding Americans,” Jonsson notes that knife control (like gun control)

has racist roots and remains a pretext for hassling young black men. “Too often we see an officer who may or may not understand the law arrest somebody for having an illegal knife that isn’t illegal,” Ritter tells him. “We too often see that kind of either blatant ignorance of the law or willful ignorance of the law, in an effort to abuse citizens’ rights to carry this tool.”

Baltimore City State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby announces charges are filed against the six city police officers suspended in the Freddie Gray case.

Donta Allen shared Freddie Gray's last ride inside a paddy-wagon arrested for weed which is not an arrestable offense in Baltimore

Donta Allen shared Freddie Gray’s last ride inside a paddy-wagon arrested for weed which is not an arrestable offense in Baltimore

 
  • US Supreme Court upheld circuit court holdings:
    • A person can not be required to furnish identification if not reasonably suspected of any criminal conduct.
    • A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity alone is insufficient to justify a patdown search
    • The person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.
    • Vagrancy ordinances cannot turn otherwise innocent conduct into a crime.
    • Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under U.S. Constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion, to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to one’s business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. One may travel along the public highways or in public places; and while conducting themselves in a decent and orderly manner, disturbing no other, and interfering with the rights of no other citizens, there, they will be protected under the law, not only their persons, but in their safe conduct. Any law that would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a conservator of the peace, unless for some breach of the peace committed in his presence, or upon suspicion of felony, would be most oppressive and unjust, and destroy all the rights, which the Constitution guarantees.
    • An innocent person cannot generally know when a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that his behavior warrants further investigation for criminal activity, and therefore cannot know when refusal to identify himself will be a crime.
    • No one may be required under peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.
    • Police knowledge of the identity of an individual they have deemed “suspicious” grants the police unfettered discretion to initiate or continue investigation of the person long after the detention has ended. Information concerning the stop, the arrest and the individual’s identity may become part of a large scale data bank. The serious intrusion on personal security outweighs the mere possibility that identification may provide a link leading to arrest.[4]

US Supreme Court’s own holdings:

  • While police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer.
  • Fourth Amendment concerns are implicated where a state statute permits investigative detentions in situations where the police officers lack a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on objective facts.
  • The concern with curbing criminal activity cannot justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity.
  • A state criminal statute that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a credible and reliable identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a valid stop is unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a credible and reliable identification.
  • Statutory limitations on individual freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution are examined for substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
  • In providing that a detention under a state statute may occur only where there is the level of suspicion sufficient to justify a constitutional stop, a state insures the existence of neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.[5]

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